24/7 Market News Publishes Brea Holdings PLC- CFA Analyst Report

Brea Holdings PLC- CFA Analyst Report

OVERVIEW
Brera Holdings PLC is a Dublin, Ireland based multi club ownership (MCO) company, which focuses on acquiring and developing promising sports franchises. The company went public in January 2023 and raised $7.5 million in gross proceeds. Since its IPO, the stock is traded on the Nasdaq (USA) under the ticker symbol BREA.

MCO in soccer is a trend that has grown significantly over the recent years, mainly driven by vast interest of high net-worth individuals and multi-billion private equity funds. An MCO structure is established when an investor builds a stake in more than just one sports club. According to the UEFA Club Licensing Benchmark Report 2023[1], there are 180 clubs globally that belong to a multi-club ownership structure.

Very prominent examples of MCO companies are Red Bull Salzburg (Austria), 777 Partners and the City Football Group (CFG), which is the largest MCO company to date.

CFG is mostly owned by Sheikh Mansour (80%) and Silver Lake (18%), a U.S. private equity company. All in all, CFG owns 13 clubs globally- ranging from Manchester City to New York City and clubs in India, China, Africa, and Latin America. An interesting fact is the clear hierarchy with Manchester City standing at the top. All other CFG clubs seem to function in an auxiliary type of role to support Manchester City in many ways. To ensure that players meet the standards and can be transferred easily, a uniform club philosophy is implemented across all clubs.

Furthermore, management and marketing departments can use their vast resources to promote other clubs within the structure to create benefits of scale by reaping synergies.

Hence, MCO structures offer a vast number of opportunities, which can be summarized below:

  • Realizing synergies from scouting to sponsorships, from management to medical and marketing departments
  • Streamlined overhead by implementing a centralized decision making body
  • Sharing of common resources: if an analytical tool is available for the top-club, it can be negotiated that this tool is available for all clubs of the MCO structure
  • Implementing a consistent philosophy of scouting, training and developing players across all clubs to ensure that a transfer to Europe is feasible (e.g. UEFA)
  • Value creation by identifying talent early and creating long-term contracts with promising players
  • Reducing running costs for players by renting/loaning players within the network

However, every structure also comes with some risks, like:

  • Dealing with negative publicity and repercussions from the fanbase
  • Negatively affecting the integrity of fair play, if clubs from the same network compete against each other
  • Transferring or renting players below market price within the network to create an abnormal benefit
  • Selling players at higher prices than market levels would suggest to improve the financial situation of one club in the network (or to reap tax benefits)
  • Farming second or third tier clubs in the network of good talent only to provide the top-club in the hierarchy with the best newcomers (depriving other clubs of talent)
  • Facing more regulation from UEFA or other regulating bodies (see Article 5.02 and the following)

Given the huge opportunities and the limited risks involved, it becomes clear that MCO structures are here to stay. However, a consolidation is expected among the top clubs, which can create value for companies that target undervalued clubs in the second or third leagues within or beyond Europe.

Brera Holdings PLC is the first publicly listed MCO company that strives to acquire a diversified and promising portfolio of sport clubs around the globe. To assess a potential investment in Brera via a stock purchase (BREA), a fair or intrinsic value of the company and its shares should be conducted. Given Brera’s recent IPO, it becomes 

clear that most of the following valuation approaches will rely on assumptions, which may or may not be realized.

Therefore, it is essential to understand the quality and experience of the management team and board members to determine if Brera Holdings PLC is capable of achieving long term success in the MCO universe.

MANAGEMENT AND BOARD MEMBERS

Brera Holdings PLC is steered by a team of seasoned professionals and industry experts who bring a wealth of experience to the table.

The company is run by Pierre Galoppi, who has served as the Chief Executive Officer and Interim CFO and member of the board since June 2023. Galoppi has more than three decades of experience in various industries and across the globe. His strategic insights and vast experience will be crucial for Brera’s growth.

Maria Xing will work alongside Galoppi and his team, as the new Head of Investments and Corporate Development, after specializing in MCO soccer investments for 777 Partners. Maria brings an extensive track record in sourcing, negotiating and closing deals, to the team. Her expertise will be essential for achieving Brera’s ambitious acquisition targets.

Daniel J. McClory serves as the Executive Chairman and has been a member of the board since July 2022. McClory is a seasoned investment professional and has held various Managing Director positions before joining Brera Holdings PLC. His extensive experience in finance and capital markets make him a valuable asset to the company.

In addition to the board, Brera Holdings PLC is backed by a group of notable shareholders whose diverse networks span across various industries including sports, finance, and luxury fashion; adding significant value to the company.

Considering the extensive experience, varied backgrounds, and successful histories of the management team, they are well-equipped to navigate the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead for Brera Holdings PLC.

The quality assessment of the management and the board underscores their ability to turn Brera’s vision into reality.

DATA AVAILABILITY – IPO COMPANIES

Valuing a company that is about to go public or went public recently is challenging. Financial data is often scarce and even if data can be obtained, it is often too volatile to perform traditional valuation analyses like a discounted cash flow (DCF) approach.

Besides, analyst coverage and financial news range from being limited to non-existent,
as most young companies are simply too small in terms of market capitalization to be attractive for institutional investors.

However, when it comes to savvy investing, these circumstances are exactly what you want to encounter. In crowded and overanalyzed markets, it’s nearly impossible to add value with further research or thorough analysis as most assumptions or scenarios have been covered already. Small and micro-cap stocks, on the contrary, can be a hidden gem. To assess the value of a potentially lucrative investment, a mixture of valuation models is needed to account for shortcomings. In the following section, a couple of useful techniques are introduced and discussed, so a suitable technique can be applied to derive a valuation for Brera’s stock.

PRE IPO & POST IPO VALUATION TECHNIQUES

Typical later-stage valuation approaches include the scorecard, Berkus or venture capital method. Most of them provide very little value and rely heavily on subjective assumptions regarding competitive advantages, market potential and burn rates. The scorecard method, for example, relies on the results of valuation rounds made by early-stage investors (angels, VC funds, etc.). Most of this information is private and will not be disclosed by the company or its early backers.

The Berkus method is a build-up method, which derives the total value of a company by assessing various criteria.

Given the fact that the criteria allocation is subjective and limited to a total value of $500k per block, we cannot use this approach to calculate a fair value of Brera Holdings PLC either.

This leaves us to the venture capital method, which originally derives pre and post money valuations. In short, it calculates the post money value by applying a multiple to future earnings (e.g. revenues). Then, this value is discounted back to today. If the money raised is subtracted from the discounted amount, you receive the pre money valuation.

If the subject has sufficient operating history, estimates become more reliable and quantitative in nature. The DCF analysis becomes the most widely accepted approach to forecast the Company’s value by extrapolating its recent performance.

Scenarios for various growth paths should be incorporated to generate a robust assessment. To perform a successful DCF analysis, data quality is key. In a nutshell, dividends or free cash flow figures of at least 3-5 years must be present to derive a proper forecast and a terminal value. Afterwards, these values are discounted by the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) to receive the enterprise value (EV) of the company.

Although the DCF method delivers quite accurate valuation figures, it relies heavily on the modeler’s growth assumption inputs. Therefore, it is often combined with a comparables approach, where similar listed or private companies are selected to calculate an average of their valuation multiples. Typical multiples include EV, EV/Revenue or EV/EBITDA ratios. By applying these multiples to our subject company’s performance, we can come a up with a valuation, which already incorporates the implied growth rate of the respective peer group.

The valuation outcome can then be averaged with the DCF implied value to achieve a final estimate.

Given the availability of data, the earnings multiple approach seems most promising. To conduct a valuation based on this approach, revenues need to be estimated first. Then, a multiple can be applied to come up with an estimated EV for Brera Holdings PLC. Therefore, a proper industry multiple must be obtained, which does not understate the current value of the company, as it is often the case with the multiples approach. The main reason for this shortcoming is the fact that future earnings and assets are completely ignored. This issue is known in the industry and especially valid around soccer club valuation.

To address this, Tom Markham, developed a new and innovative model in 2013 to derive the value of Premier League teams in the UK. In his paper “What is the optimal method to value a football club?”[2] he introduces a multivariate model which includes the asset base of a club as well instead of solely deriving a club valuation from broker tables, revenue multiples or market capitalization values.

As Markham’s research illustrates, most methods undervalue soccer clubs drastically compared to the actual transaction prices. Furthermore, his empirical research points out that models, which are frequently used within the industry differ a lot from each other. A good example can be made by looking at the valuation of West Ham.

According to Deloitte (Money League 2023)[3] clubs in the UK Premier League are valued with a revenue multiple between 1.5 and 2.0. Using West Ham’s revenue figures from 2021, we get a club valuation within a range of $293M and $390M ($195M revenue in 2021 according to Deloitte; rev. multiple of 1.5 – 2.0).

If this valuation is used, a 27% stake in West Ham would cost around $92M (using the mid-point or a 1.75 multiple).

However, this value stands in quite a contrast to the actual value that Czech businessman, Daniel Kretinsky, paid for his 27% stake in West Ham in 2021. According to a Guardian newspaper article[4], Kretinsky paid between $225M to $250M to complete the purchase. This would equal an extrapolated total value of West Ham up to $888M, which is more than double the upper range derived by using the revenue multiple approach ($390M).

It becomes clear that the revenue multiple drastically understates the true value of a club, by not incorporating factors like assets and potential growth rates. Otherwise, the gap between the value paid vs. the value estimated would not differ by that amount. The Markham model tries to improve the accuracy of transaction values by incorporating figures like revenues, net assets, net profits as well as the stadium usage and the wage ratio of the respective club. If the model is used to calculate the value of West Ham, an estimate of about $1B is derived. This is slightly above the value of $888M, but closer to reality than the traditional multiple approach.

Although the Markham multivariate model would seem promising and suitable to value clubs within an MCO structure, it cannot be applied to Brera Holdings PLC as data from its clubs is simply not available yet. Without stadium usage, wage ratios and net profits, the model seems of little use to us.

To conclude this section, the analysis of various valuation techniques illustrated potentials and shortcomings of different approaches. It became clear that, although a traditional DCF method cannot be used, we can start by obtaining multiples of a peer group to apply them on estimated revenue figures. If a time series of revenues is constructed, we derive enterprise values and henceforth implied intrinsic stock values which can be discounted by the WACC.

VALUATION – COMPARABLES APPROACH

In the first step, a set of comparable companies is compiled. However, as Brera Holdings PLC is the first publicly listed MCO company, we cannot assume to find a proper set of similar companies. Data on privately owned MCO companies like CFG is not publicly available either, but according to various newspaper articles, CFG seems to be worth around $4.8B after Silver Lake bought its original stake of 10% for $500M in 2019[5].

According to other data sources, CFG generated roughly $600M revenue in 2020 which resulted in a negative net income of around $230M. Total assets of CFG are valued with around $1.7B[6]. By performing a simple back of the envelope calculation, we could derive an EV/Revenue multiple of 8 ($4.8B/$600M; assuming a net debt of zero).

However, it must be mentioned that this multiple cannot be used as industry standard given the unverified source of data and reliance on just one revenue figure of 2020. Furthermore, CFG is the top-of-the-line MCO company which owns prestigious clubs around the globe. Therefore, it becomes clear that investors are likely to pay a premium for owning a stake in this MCO structure.

As Brera Holdings PLC focuses more on undervalued second or third league clubs around the globe and strives to make an impact through social soccer games as well, a peer group of existing and publicly listed soccer clubs seems more applicable to construct a robust peer group in the first step.

Table 1 illustrates a selection of publicly traded companies, which mainly run sports or soccer clubs. Manchester United (MANU) is the most valuable soccer club in this list and currently trades at a market capitalization of around $2.6B. Sporting Clube de Braga (SCB) trades at the lowest valuation in this list (market cap of $18.2M). Hence, the sample offers insight into the valuation and current price returns from large-cap (above $1B market cap) to small-cap (above $150M) and micro-cap (above $10M) companies.

Focusing on table 1, it can be mentioned that stocks from soccer clubs exhibit quite volatile price movements, as their three-month (3M) returns range from +14% to -25%. On average, the year to date (YTD) total return of the peer group was slightly negative with -2.03% given the underperformance of Manchester United stock. If large caps are excluded, the average YTD performance turns slightly positive to 1.05%.

Comparing the stock price of BREA to the average of the peer group (ex-large caps) makes its volatility quite apparent. The lack of proper data and very strong reactions to news releases (new hires, new acquisitions) make the company vulnerable to large price moves. As more financial data is released going forward, a decline in volatility can be expected.

Table 2 expands table 1 by stating various financial ratios for the peer group. These ratios are needed to derive proper industry multiples to perform a comparables valuation of Brera Holdings PLC at a later stage. What becomes apparent is that EBITDA values fluctuate and can be negative for large-cap clubs (JUVE) as well. Besides, soccer clubs have a Debt to Asset ratio of 35% on average and their EV trades at a multiple of 1.86 to their total revenues (sales). To derive the EV, the total value of equity (market capitalization) is combined with the value of net debt (financial liabilities minus financial assets like cash).

If large-cap clubs (MANU, JUVE, BVB) are excluded from the sample (green marked values), the EV/Revenue (Sales) multiple declines to 1.43. Both values stand in stark contrast to the multiple of the privately owned CFG of around 8.

However, if more recent CFG revenue data and debt issuance is taken into account, the ratio declines to a more reasonable value of around 6. Still, the gap between the largest MCO company and the average of the peer group above seems quite substantial. Two cases can be made to justify a higher multiple for MCO companies. First, they own a diversified portfolio compared to a soccer club alone.

Second, MCO structures can grow their revenues by adding more clubs and implement measures to reduce costs.

Given the vast growth opportunities for MCO companies and the various revenue sources (from transfer fees to consulting work) a multiple of around 5 seems justifiable to derive a first valuation of BREA. The peer group average of 1.9 (table 2) seems suitable for single sport clubs only and would understate the value of Brera’s MCO drastically as has been illustrated by the West Ham example before.

VALUATION – REVENUE ESTIMATION

To value a company based on the revenue multiple approach, revenue figures are needed. These figures should be accurate and exclude one-time effects to ensure a stable valuation. Given the scarcity of available data for Brera Holdings PLC, the revenue multiple approach demands some data gathering and estimation first.

First, all historic revenues from the years before the IPO can be used as rough estimate to gauge the revenue of the Brera FC and the FENIX trademark. By applying a multiple of 1.2, a first estimation of the asset value can be made. All other assets were purchased post IPO. Thus, we need to establish how much of the IPO proceeds are available for acquisitions, which in turn will generate revenue for Brera Holdings PLC.
According to the IPO prospectus, the IPO proceeds will be used in the following manner:

  • 40% of the net proceeds will be used for acquiring management rights of soccer clubs
  • 20% of the net proceeds are available for continued investment in social impact soccer
  • 20% of the net proceeds are available for sales and marketing
  • 20% of the net proceeds are available for working capital and general corporate purposes

This implies that roughly $3M are available to purchase undervalued sports clubs around the world. The other figures (20% for social impact soccer, sales and marketing) will definitely create an incremental revenue as well, but we excluded these values for now.

Table 3 illustrates all acquisitions made to date and includes purchasing values as well (if a value could be obtained from an SEC filing). After converting the purchases to USD, we apply industry multiples to gauge an incremental revenue share of the respective club. For example, the 51% stake of the UYBA Volley Club, which was acquired by Brera Holdings PLC in July 2023, came with a purchase price of around $0.9M and should generate an annual revenue of at least $0.45M for BREA. By estimating an incremental revenue share for all existing and recently acquired assets, we can forecast a total revenue figure for 2023 and beyond.

In total, it can be estimated that all previous acquisitions will generate a total, annual revenue of $1.2M from 2023 onwards. This value should be considered as the baseline figure, as it does not include pending negotiations and any price winnings, transfer or consulting revenues. Furthermore, Brera Holdings PLC still has a war chest of roughly $1.5M after only half of the total amount for acquisitions ($3M) was spent in 2023.

Without tapping into debt financing (a $100M shelf-offering was filed, hence a vast amount for hybrid-financed purchases is available), an annual revenue of $2M to $2.5M can be achieved organically.

Given the fact that management shows a strong willingness to build a diversified portfolio of emerging sports clubs, it is expected that the number of acquisitions will increase. If the shelf-offering is tapped and more clubs are acquired within the next months or year, revenues increase drastically. Thus, it is not surprising that rumors are flying around a possible purchase of Brescia FC, an Italian B-Series soccer club[7]. The club is quite established and valued at around $22M (€20M), which would constitute Brera’s largest purchase yet. Debt financing (or hybrid via warrants or preferred shares) is needed, but that’s what the shelf-offering is for. The aforementioned acquisition will be considered for the conservative scenario as it seems to be in its final negotiation stages.

To build a best-case scenario, the purchase of another club (Series A or B) for the total amount of €25M is modelled as well. In this case, the incremental revenue increases by around $13M compared to the conservative scenario and leads to complete different valuation ranges – although hybrid financing with debt servicing costs of around $3M per year and an increased share count are included in the estimations.

VALUATION: EV & IMPLIED STOCK PRICE ESTIMATION

After revenue estimates from table 3 are obtained, a revenue forecast was created until 2027. Table 4 illustrates a conservative forecast and includes some figures for EBITDA and net income as well, although these values should be viewed with caution, as their estimation range is very volatile. The most important figures are total revenues and the peer group multiple of 5, which is used to derive an EV.

As table 4 shows, revenues grow steadily from 2023 thanks to continued acquisitions of new clubs by investing the net IPO proceeds and funds from the shelf-offering. From 2025 onwards, an industry specific growth rate[8] of 14% is applied to gauge proper growth. Moreover, it is estimated that 11% of revenue (base 2023) can be generated additionally via consulting projects. As mentioned, no additional revenues from transferring players or prices (winnings) are included in the conservative scenario.

By applying all parameters of the conservative scenario, the EV can be forecasted and in turn, the market capitalization is derived by adding total cash and deducting debt and preferred equity. This approach leads to an implied fair value market capitalization of $8.8M for 2023. If this value is divided by the number of shares outstanding, an implied fair value share price can be calculated. All values from 2025 onwards are discounted by the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) for Brera Holdings PLC of 10%. The WACC was calculated by using the current long-term bond rate and the equity market risk premium to create a proper discount rate for our subject company. Given its size (micro-cap) and new business model, a risk adjustment was made as well. As soon as the company matures, the WACC tends to decrease.

For the last year (2023), the implied fair value for Brera Holdings PLC stock was at around $0.9 per share, which would be 23% less than its current stock price (as of May 2024). However, this valuation approach completely ignores growth projections and assets, which can be used for future acquisitions in 2024 and onwards.

As stock prices reflect estimates about future growth and development, the scenario for 2025 should be taken into account if the current value of the stock price is assessed. In 2025, it is assumed that $23M were invested in new clubs, which leads to revenues of around $15M. Given these estimates, we can conclude that BREA stock currently trades 74% below its implied fair value of $4.34 (2025).

If the shelf-offering is not tapped again and no further acquisitions take place after 2025, the revenue will increase alongside the industry growth rate and by tapping other revenue sources like consulting projects. Even without further club purchases, the EV enterprise value continues to increase and can reach $117M in 2027. Assuming that no further debt is issued, and cash is mostly depleted, the implied market capitalization totals $97M, which implies a stock price estimate of $8.64 per share. Even after discounting, BREA stock offers a significant upside in the medium term of more than 400% – even in a conservative scenario.


Conservative Scenario Estimates

However, as management pointed out multiple times, their objective is to acquire emerging clubs around the globe and make Brera Holdings PLC a key player within the MCO universe. Hence, the best-case scenario seems more realistic in terms of alignment with the overall company vision.

Following the same approach for the best-case scenario, table 5 starts with estimating revenues (based on table 3) to derive the EV and the intrinsic stock price. As mentioned in table 3, it is assumed that the shelf-offering is tapped by $36M to purchase two or more clubs with large potential. Therefore, the 2024 revenue jumps to $25M and continues to grow with the same growth multiples applied in table 4 in the following years. It becomes apparent that, initially, net income is negatively impacted because debt needs to be serviced. However, given that hybrid financing options (warrants, etc.) are available via the shelf offering, a combined debt/equity purchase of the second acquisition ($26M) is considered in the forecast.

Given the solid revenue growth in the best-case estimate, EV is forecasted to increase from $6.4M in 2023 to almost $250M in 2027. Similar to the EV, the implied stock price rises from $0.93 to $9.26 in 2027 (discounted values), implying a total upside potential of 720% ($9.26 vs. $1.12 today). Even for 2024, the implied fair value of Brera’s stock is four times higher than its current stock price ($4.93 vs. $1.12). Thus, it can be expected that the stock will react quickly when earnings and financial data are published, or new acquisitions become public.

To summarize the valuation section, table 6 offers a combined scenario which averages the conservative and the best-case outcomes to illustrate a baseline scenario as well. As the figures show, the stock shows a significant upside potential from this year forward and can quadruple its value quickly – if and only if the estimates hold.

Recent cases, such as Wrexham Football Club, owned by Ryan Reynolds and Rob McElhenny, show that valuations can quadruple quickly – especially if the club is promoted to a higher league. A recent newspaper article reported that Wrexham’s value increased more than four times from $2.5M when they took over in 2022 to $11M today[9]. Although we have to acknowledge that Reynolds leveraged his Hollywood fame to increase Wrexham’s exposure, it demonstrates what can be achieved if the right people collaborate and add value to the club and its players.

CONCLUSION

Although soccer clubs and multi club ownership models (MCOs) have some history, proper valuation approaches are still lacking. The industry relies mostly on brokerage estimates (Forbes, etc.) or uses static valuation multiples to estimate the value of a sports club. New models like the Markham model have been introduced but need reliable input to perform. And that’s the catch, because most data is neither reliable nor available. Furthermore, even established and publicly listed soccer clubs do not generate a positive net income on a consistent basis, which makes the use of traditional DCF models difficult.

Therefore, a mixture of approaches has been considered to provide a rough and first valuation for Brera Holdings PLC. Given its recent IPO (2023), financial data is still scarce and most platforms are not able to provide any kind of value above the current stock price. The same holds true for analyst coverage, which is nonexistent for a lot of micro-cap stocks. However, obstacles – once they have been overcome – can turn into opportunities and for Brera Holdings PLC, the future seems bright. First and foremost, because of its top of the class management and vast network of specialists but also due to its highly lucrative niche in focusing on undervalued second or third league clubs around the globe. Compared to top-clubs, which can be overvalued and sometimes even part of bidding-frenzies, true value is often found in the overlooked areas, which is exactly what Brera’s management is focused on. Its team works tirelessly to identify undervalued clubs with emerging talent, which can be challenged and fostered, so a transfer in a top-league club comes within reach. If a transfer or a lease can be achieved, profits can easily reach into the millions – as previous examples have shown. Even if a transfer seems unlikely, there is still a local tournament, which can be won or sponsors to be found. To keep it short and simple – the opportunities for revenue generation withing the fields of soccer are vast.

However, Brera Holdings PLC does not only focus on soccer. It assembles various sports clubs including volleyball club UYBA and fosters its social impact tournament. Thus, revenue will be more robust and diversified compared to figures from a soccer club alone.

Does the share price already reflect its potential? Not at all. Given Brera’s short history and first mover status (first publicly listed MCO company), investors still have reservations about its outlook. In one way, this can be justified because investments in micro-cap stocks tend to be very volatile and the risks are significant. This holds true for an investment in BREA as well, but as even the conservative valuation forecast illustrates – sufficient upside potential exists for the stock price. If you want to capture it, you need to take some risks. If we wait until all uncertainty fades and growth numbers can be estimated with high accuracy, the stock price will reflect it already.

Thus, like in soccer – an investment in BREA is worth taking a shot. With a little bit of luck, you can end up being a big winner.

Analyst Report Disclosure:

Sascha P. Czerwenka, CFA, authored this report on Brera Holdings using publicly available sources and reflecting his personal views of the Company. Sascha’s compensation for writing and publishing this report is not influenced by the views expressed in the analysis. While every effort has been made to ensure the reliability of the information used, readers are advised to conduct their own due diligence to obtain the most current publicly available information. My compensation creates a conflict of interest, which should be considered when reading this report.

This report was commissioned by 24/7 Market News (24/7) on behalf of Brera Holdings as part of its ongoing investor relations efforts. I, the analyst, do not own any shares of Brera Holdings and will not engage in trading the stock at any time. Brera Holdings has engaged 24/7 for this report and will compensate Four Thousand dollars per quarter for one year of coverage.  24/7 has also in the past been engaged by Totaligent on behalf of Brera Holdings, to prepare and disseminate press articles, editorials, and other investor-related communications. 24/7 editors and affiliates do not own Brera Holdings and will not be buying or selling any in the open markets. 24/7 could additionally be compensated in the future, by Brera Holdings for additional market research and coverage.

The valuations presented are based on both current and forward-looking statements, intended to provide investors with valuable insights into the company’s current and future business prospects. This report does not imply or guarantee past or future performance. The content, including reports, articles, and company materials, is for informational purposes only and should not be considered an offer to buy or sell any securities mentioned.


[1] https://www.uefa.com/news-media/news/027e-1747598eeb3b-436611261ff3-1000–how-european-football-has-emerged-from-the-pandemic-detail/

[2]https://www.researchgate.net/publication/256054550_What_is_the_Optimal_Method_to_Value_a_Football_Club

[3] https://www2.deloitte.com/uk/en/pages/sports-business-group/articles/deloitte-football-money-league.htm

[4]  https://www.theguardian.com/football/2021/nov/10/daniel-kretinsky-completes-purchase-of-27-percent-stake-in-west-ham

[5] https://www.cityfootballgroup.com/information-resource/news-and-press-packs/cfg-announces-us-500-million-strategic-investment-by-silver-lake/

[6] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/City_Football_Group

[7] https://www.bresciaoggi.it/argomenti/sport/brescia-calcio/una-societa-quotata-al-nasdaq-vuole-il-brescia-offerta-da-20-milioni-1.10683113

[8] https://www2.deloitte.com/uk/en/pages/sports-business-group/articles/deloitte-football-money-league.html

[9] https://www.themirror.com/sport/soccer/wrexham-value-ryan-reynolds-mcelhenney-402554

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